Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.
The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century
By Brad RobertsSTANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
Copyright © 2016 Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-8047-9713-9
Contents
Acknowledgments,
Introduction,
1. The Evolution of U.S. Nuclear Policy and Posture since the End of the Cold War,
2. The First New Problem: Nuclear-Armed Regional Challengers,
3. The New Regional Deterrence Strategy,
4. The Second New Problem: Relations with Putin's Russia,
5. The Evolving Relationship with China,
6. Extended Deterrence and Strategic Stability in Europe,
7. Extended Deterrence and Strategic Stability in Northeast Asia,
8. The Broader Nuclear Assurance Agenda,
9. Conclusions,
Epilogue: Implications for Future Strategy, Policy, and Posture Reviews,
Notes,
Index,
CHAPTER 1The Evolution of U.S. Nuclear Policy and Posture since the End of the Cold War
TO UNDERSTAND THE CURRENT MOMENT IN U.S. NUCLEAR policy and debate, some historical perspective is useful. U.S. nuclear policy used to be at the center of the U.S. national security debate; as it has become marginalized over the last three decades, it has become increasingly difficult to see the elements of continuity and change in U.S. policy and to understand the lessons of past experience for current and future policy.
This chapter begins with a summary of the nuclear inheritance from the Cold War in terms of the policy and posture in place in 1990. It then reviews the evolution of policy and posture with each subsequent presidential administration. This review includes also developments in the nongovernmental expert community that influenced U.S. policy. Following on this chronological overview, the chapter then identifies elements of change and continuity in U.S. nuclear policy and posture over the last twenty- five years. The chapter then pivots to the twenty-five years ahead. It sets out some critical decisions that must be made about the future of U.S. nuclear posture. This analysis highlights the weakness of the intellectual and political foundations on which such decisions will be made.
The Cold War Inheritance
With the collapse of the Soviet Union on Christmas Day 1991, one chapter in U.S. nuclear history ended and another began. At that time, U.S. nuclear policy and posture reflected the long-standing bipolar standoff and decades of technically driven arms competition with the Soviet Union.
Following the modernization of the U.S. nuclear posture in the 1980s, the U.S. nuclear arsenal contained approximately 21,000 weapons in late 1991. The triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems (submarine-launched ballistic missiles [SLBMs], land-based intercontinental-range ballistic missiles [ICBMs], and strategic bombers) was completing a cycle of modernization, along with the associated warheads. U.S. nuclear weapons were also deployed in both Europe and East Asia. This large force was supported by a modern command and control system ensuring presidential control of nuclear operations even under nuclear attack. The overall size and structure of U.S. nuclear forces were a function of the requirements of deterrence of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, with any other contingency deemed a lesser-included problem. The standing force was supported by a robust research, development, and production capacity for both warheads and delivery systems.
In 1990, the United States and Soviet Union were actively pursuing arms control across a broad front, following the thaw in their political relations. The Treaty on Intermediate-range Nu
